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FOR RELEASE JUNE 10, 1962 
4:00P.M., E.S.T. 
INTERESTS AND POLICIES IN SOUTEEAST ASIA 
Commencement Address by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana) 
Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 
Sunday, June 10, 1962, 4:00p.m., E.S.T. 
I am happy to be with you and grateful for the privilege of join-
ing the class of 1962. It is especially pleasant to be here because of past 
contacts with your faculty and, most especially, with my old friend, Ernest 
Melby, former Chancellor of the University of Montana. 
Members of the Michigan State staff are often encountered in Wash-
ington and in the far-fl1.~ng corners of the world. I cannot remember the 
nllmber of times, for examp2..e, that I have run into your Professor Wesley 
Fishel and my old colleague from Montana, Professor Guy Fox, in Saigon. 
Together with the rest of the training-mission of Michigan State, they have 
made important contributions to the Republic of Viet Nam. As for your Presi-
dent, Dr. Hannah, his travel-mileage on behalf of the nation--and, inciden-
tally, Michigan State--is rivaled only by that of the Secretary of State and 
Members of Congress. 
I have heard it said that the sun never sets on the faculty of 
Michigan State. It is reassuring, therefore, to come here and discover 
that the faculty has a natural habitat . It is such a delightful habitat 
one wonders why so many of its members have been persuaded to leave for 
the enervating tropics of Asia and Washington. 
They have been persuaded, I suspect, even as the nation has been 
persuaded, to enter into new channels of international activity, by the 
events of the past two decades. The nation has become deeply committed 
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throughout the world. Skilled members of this university are among the 
thousands of Americans who are working abroad with great dedication to 
discharge that commitment. 
It is to this commitment, notably, as it is involved in Southeast 
Asia which I would address your attention. I have chosen this subject, in 
part, because of the close association which has existed between Michigan 
State and Viet Nam. I have chosen it, too, in part because events appear 
to be moving in Southeast Asia tovards a point of critical decision. _L!VseR:t 
As you know, we have recently landed combat forces in Thailand. 
This movement of troops follows the strengtheni.ng of the United States 
military training mission in Viet Nam. Both steps represent a deepening of 
an already very deep involvement on the Southeast Asian mainland. 
In this, as in all cases of foreign policy and military command, 
the responsibility for the direction of the nation's course rests with the 
President. It is a grave and difficult responsibility. In discharging it, 
the President is entitled to the understanding and support of the nation. 
May I say that he has had both in the Senate of the United States, from the 
leadership of both parties. He has kept the Congress fully informed on the 
situation as it has developed. In a similar manner he has tried to keep the 
people of the nation informed through his frequent press conferences. 
Support of the President does not preclude public discussion of 
the situation in Southeast Asia. On the contrary, it presupposes it. The 
President would be the last to expect a moratorium on public participation 
of this kind. It is politl.cs that needs to stop at the water ' s edge, not 
serious consideration of the nation's course in its relations with the rest 
of the world. Rather than less, we need more public consideration of t his 
matter. 
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The need is especially acute with respect to Southeast Asia. 
Until recent times it has been an area remote from the general awareness 
of the nation. It is not surprising that the public, even today, knows 
little about the region. Indeed, it is doubtful that a decade ago, more 
than a small fraction of the civilian and military personnel of the govern-
ment and the journalists who are now immersed in its place-names could have 
quickly located the Kingdom of Laos, let alone its towns and villages, on a 
map of Asia. 
Yet this obscure land on the borders of South China now writes 
headline after heaclline in the daily press. It keeps the lights on through 
the night in the Pentagon, the State Department and the Central Intelligence 
Agency. It has been the immediate cause of the dispatch of United States com-
bat forces to Thailand and a partial cause of the strengthening of the mili-
tary mission in VietNam. In a decade about $400 million in u.s. military 
and other aid has gone into this one nation whose population is far smaller 
than that of the Detroit Metropolitan region and is scattered in jungle and 
hill over an area the size of Oregon. 
In 1953 when I first visited Laos, just two junior resident State 
Department officials were deemed sufficient for the protection of all United 
States interests in the entire country. Almost a decade later, hundreds of 
officials from half a dozen federal agencies--military and civilian--were 
on the scene. 
This transition in Laos highlights the transition in the United 
States relationship with all of Southeast Asia. From a minimum of contact 
and cost scarcely a dozen yeers ago we have moved, today, to a point of 
saturated involvement and immense expense. This progressive involvement 
has not been a party matter--a republican policy or a democratic policy. 
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It began und.er a Democratic Administration. It intensified sharply under a 
Republican Administration. And it is now being dealt with once again by a 
Democratic Administration. 
The roots of this involvement in Southeast Asia lie in the vast 
displocation which was produced in Asia by World War II. But in a more 
specific sense, it dates from the period of the Korean Conflict. 
You will recall that about a dozen years ago revolution swept like 
a giant tidal wave ttu:ough China. It spilled over the Chinese borders in the 
north, into Korea. It gave every sign of engulfing Indo-China to the South. 
That region, itself, was in the midst of a mixed and confusing Communist-
nationalist-monarchist upheaval, but in essentials, a revolution against the 
reassertion of French colonial control after World War II. 
Engaged in the conflict in Korea, we sought for strategic reasons 
to prevent Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia. So we began to go to the 
aid, first, of' the French and after them, the successor governments of Indo-
China--in Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia. 
The military situation was eventt1ally stabilized in Korea by 
negotiations. It was also stabilized in Indo-China largely through the 
diplomacy which produced the Geneva Agreements of 1954. 
A kind of uneasy truce settled over Asia. But there was no change 
in the deep-seated hostility between Chinese communism and the United States. 
Peking continued to single us out as the number one enemy of the Chinese 
people. We continued the policy of wartime boycott of the Chinese mainland--
total economic and cultural boycott and almost total diplomatic boycott. The 
military situation in both the Formosan Straits and Korea remained ominous. 
The political situation in the divided countries of Laos and Viet Nam re-
mained unsettled. 
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There followed, then, a United States effort to keep China out of 
So'..l.theast Asia and to forestall the spread of communism in that region. It 
was at this point that our direct involvement began to deepen in earnest. We 
emb~ked upon a massive military aid program to Southeast Asian nations . All 
policy was directed preponderantly to the building of strong anti-connnunist 
military establishments and governments. We sougat, further, to bring the 
region uader the protective umbreJ~a of t he Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 
SEATO, -which was expected to marshall nations both within and without the area 
for a common defense of the region against communi sm. 
In Laos and in south Viet Nam, particularly, the immense cost of 
sustaining the large military establishments built by u.s. military aid re-
quired, in turn, large annual economic aid-subsidies to these countries. 
Neither form of aid has had much effect on the economic or social well-being 
of the ordinary people of these nations. The principal gain of these programs 
has flowed to a relatively small number of persons in the cities and to mili-
tary personnel. 
In addition, to t his massive military and military-support program 
of aid, some effort was made to help improve the l et of the ordinary people 
by technical and other assistance for economic and social development. 
Finally, I should mention the extension of the information program 
into Southeast Asia. Again, the contrast in ten years is significant. From 
a minor operation confined largely to the environs of the cities of Saigon 
and Bangkok, t he voice of America has been carried by radio and pamphlet and 
motion picture, by boat, plane, jeep and f oot and, I would presume even by 
e l ephant, into the remotest villages and hamlets of Southeast Asia. The 
output of words increased massively and impressively. So, too, of course, 
did the cost toihe people of the United States. 
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Over a ten-year period, the foreign aid-program--military and non-
military--alone has resQlted in authorized appropriations of the public funds 
of this nation of well over $3 billion for these Southeast Asian nations. 
This total does not ~ake into account the salaries and expenses of the 
thousands of military and civilian personnel of the government who have seen 
service in the area during this period. It does not take into account the 
cost of our participation in SEATO and consequent mi litary deployments such 
as has occurred in recent weeks in and around Thailand. It does not take 
into account the cost of the expansion of the information, programs and 
other government activity. 
Altogether, the commitment of resources to Southeast Asia in a 
decade has bee~ enormous by any measureo Yet it would be a small price to 
pay if it were to yield a durable peace and safeguard an opport~ity for 
the growth of stable free nations in that region. Unfortunately, the ex-
perience of the past decade is not such as to give rise to sanguine expecta-
tions in this respect. 
We have the experience of SEATO. It is difficult to assess its 
value in forestalling military adventures by the Communists. Perhaps it 
has had some effect; perhe~s it has not. 
clear by the recent military deployment. 
But one thing has been made very 
We have allies under SEATO to be 
sure, but allies either unwilling or unable to assume but the smallest frac-
tion of the burdens of the alliance. I say that not as criticism of any 
member of SEA~U. Each nation has its own problems and capacities and I do 
not presume to judge them. But this nation, too, has its problems. And 
one of them is to avoid miscalculations in policies which may derive from 
the gap between the presumed promise and the actual fulfillment in any mili-
tary alliance. 
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We have the experience, too, of Laos. There has been eight years 
of military and other aid of the most intensive, indeed, the most extravagant 
kind to that country. There have been millions of costly words and pictures 
and sounds on the virtues of freedom and the evils of communism disseminated 
throughout a Kingdom in which, may I say, neither the concept of Western 
freedom or We stern communism can have much meaning. For it is a kingdom of 
isolated villagers, still living in a relatively contented, peaceful, Buddhist 
culture centuries old. Eight years of aid and words and other operations, in 
the end, have produced scarcely a ripple in Laos, except in the capital city. 
And what it produced there, to say the least, does not speak well for it. 
Laos is, clearly, in far more danger, today, of a collapse into a kind of 
communism under outside domination or, perhaps, to division and destruction 
as a nation, than when this whole process began--when the country was led by 
one who tried to think and act in terms of the Kingdom's neutralism and 
greater self-reliance. 
We have the experience of Viet Nam. A la this situation, after years 
of military assistance of a most costly kind, it is discovered that the aid 
vent to build the wrong kinds of forces and that it is now necessary to build 
almost from scratch with the aid of thourends of additional American training 
and support f orces and at an even higher level of annual aid. It is also 
discovered that a great deal more emphasis on political and economic develop-
ment is now required in Viet Nam, although the need for this latter course 
has been pointed out time and again in the Congress for many years. 
There is no longer any escaping the fact that after years of 
enoi'!!IOus expenditures of aid in south Viet Nam, that country is more, 
rather than less, dependent on aid from the United States. VietNam's 
independent survival is less rather than more secure than it was five or 
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six years ago. Once again the bombs explode in Saigon as they have not done 
since the early days, which Professor Fishel will remember with me, of the 
establishment of the Republic in 1953-55· 
One can only hope that a similar process of increasing dependency 
and increasing insecurity is not now about to begin in Thailand. 
I think, in all honesty, that we must c0ntrast these situations 
with those which exist in Burma and in Cambodia. B1~a has a non-communist 
independence which is, at this moment, more secure than that of Laos and 
Viet Nam. Yet it has obtained little aid from us. Cambodia has received 
from us a fraction of the per capita aid which has gone to Viet Nam or Laos. 
It has received aid from many countries) including Communist countries. Yet, 
its non-communist independence is certainly not less, it is far more .secure 
than that of Laos. Indeed, it is, as of this ffioment, among the most peaceful 
and stable of all the nations of Asia. 
Now, I think we must realize that situations differ in these various 
nations. Communist and other pressures--internal and external--vary. So do 
historic and strategic circumstances. But it is not without significance in 
our comprehension of the total situation in Southeast Asia that in nations in 
which our aid-commitment has been relatively limited, the prospects are no 
worse for the survival of non-communist independence than in those in which 
we are massively committed. 
Before this phenomenon can yield anything of relevance to policy, 
however, we must get clearly in mind the interests of this nation in Southeast 
Asia which we are trying to protect. For, I presume, that it is on the basis 
of these interests that we have made this great commitment. 
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A nation's interests are of two kind8--those which are basic and 
enduring and those which are transitory and peripheral. And history indi-
cates to us that our enduring interests in Southeast Asia are limited. History 
also indicates to us that these limited iuterests in commerce, cu.lture and 
security have been, in the past, most effectively safeguarded by a policy of 
minimum involvement. He have, in the past, avoidAd interfering in the internal 
political affairs of the Southeast Asian nations. We have, in the past, mini-
mizedour military commitment on the Southeast Asian mainland--even during the 
griremest days of tlorld Har II. Ttle have, in the past, given appropriate en-
couragement to the emergence of independent nationhood in the region. We have, 
in the past, sought to act in a fashion which would not tarnish the symbol of 
freedom and human decency which this nation has long been in Asia or alienate 
the friendship of the peoples of that region, regardJ.ess of what governments 
might temporarily hold sway over them. We have, in the past, through diplomacy, 
sought to do our small share in the preservation of peace in that region as part 
of our general interest in the ma1 ntene.n-:::e of vrorld peace. 
I do not see tha-I' these e•·durlng interests have changr:d in any signi-
f:l.ce.nt degree. Our commercial and cultural ccntacts with Southe'lst Asia are 
still limited. Our security interests in Southeast Asia, in terms of the de-
fense of the United States are still limited. 
Yet, it is obvious that in the past decade the policy of minimum 
involvement and, incidentally, minimum cost, by which we have traditionally 
defended these limited interests, has shifted about 180° to the point of very 
deep involvement and enormous cost. 
I have already pointed out how the Korean conflict precipitated this 
drastic change in course in Southeast Asia. How we reached the present point 
is understandable. The question which we have not yet faced, the question 
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which may now be approaching the point of critical decisions is whether this 
change is to become a permanent part of our foreign policy. If it is, then 
we must be prepared, at best, to carry an annual burden of several hundred 
millions of dollars of military and economic subsidies to anti-communist 
governments in the region for many years. We will have to do that whether 
or not they are responsive governments in terms of their own peoples needs. 
We must be prepared to extend this support in Southeast Asia for the indefi-
nite future through the whole costly mechanism of aid and propaganda. We 
must be prepared to bear the human and material cost of keeping an inde-
terminate number of combat troops in that region, on garrison duty or for 
more serious purposes as may be necessary. All these things we must be pre-
pared to do at best. At worst, we must be prepared for a possible conflict 
of indefinite depth and duration, dependent largely on our forces for its 
prosecution. 
These are the facts, the realities of the situation. Grim as 
they are, I believe that it is eminently desirable that they be faced now, 
whatever our decisions may be. 
In all candor I must ask: Is a permanent policy of that kind 
justified on the basis of any enduring interests of the people of the United 
States in Southeast Asia7 Is it more valid now, than in the past, to in-
volve ourselves in internal political situations in the countries of that 
region--to maintain any government in a state of quasi-dependency on us for 
the indefinite future? Is it more valid now, than in the past, to assume 
the primary burden for the political, economic and social future of these 
lands7 
I have raised these questions and I would anticipate that you might 
raise others. The fact is that these approaches are, at best, doubtful because 
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they are irumensely costly in ratio to any enduring interests of the people 
of the u.s. in Southeast Asia. They are doubtful because, in the long run, 
they will yield little to the people of this nation and little to the people 
of Southeast Asia exce2t a mult iplication of their already immense social 
and economic difficulties. These approaches are doubtful because they bring 
upon us a vague responsibility for the internal evolution of the nations of 
Southeast Asia, a responsibility which no nation can discharge for another 
in this day and age, a responsibility which it is the right and duty of the 
people and leacers of those nations themselves to assume, a responsibility 
which, after many costly decades, we relinquished in the Philippines wiih 
no intention of a ssuming elsewhere. 
While ttese approaches are doubtful, there is not assurance that 
they can be avoided. We have accumulated binding treaty commitments over 
the years and integrity demands that these be honored. Moreover, one can-
not know what other nations may do in this situation; and at this late hour 
any improvement in the situation depends on the attitudes of many govern-
ments. It depends heavily on the Chinese in Peking. It depends heavily on 
the Soviet Russian government. It depends on political and military leaders 
in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in Asia. Indeed, it depends on all govern-
ments which by reason of their membership in the United Nations have a 
measure of responsibility for the maintenance of peace wherever it may be 
threatened. 
But let there be no doubt that it also depends on us. Regardless 
of these other factors, it remains for us, now, to draw clearly the distinc-
tion between what is enduring and basic and what is transitory and peripheral 
in our interests with respect to Southeast Asia. It remains for us to hold 
fast to the one and seek actively to minimize the other, to the end that the 
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haphazard commitment and waste of resources in which we have indulged for years 
in the pursuit not only of our enduring interests but of political slogans and 
shibboleths may cease. 
To the extent that we do vrhat we ourselves must do, I believe we 
shall begin to discern the basis for a ne~>r approach to policy in Southeast 
Asia. It will be an approach which will: 
(l) explore actively, intensely a~d continuously every possi-
bility of minimizing the unilateral activity of the United States in Southeast 
Asia in every sphere; 
(2) re-examine SEATO in the light of the recent experience in 
Thailand and not hesitate to attempt to modify or alter it, if other ways of 
maintaining peace and independence in Southeast Asia become evident; 
(3) seek vigorously to diffuse, through the United Nations 
or through any other feasible grouping of nations, the enormous burden of 
assisting nations of Southeast Asia to bring their economies and social 
structures more up-to-date; 
(4) place less emphasis on political and military subsidies, 
propaganda and other devices of the cold war and more emphasis on a vigorous 
and persistent tre.di tional diplomacy for the development of a more stable 
situation in the area; 
(5) pay more attention to the manner in which the reasonable 
needs and aspirations of the people of the nations of Southeast Asia are being 
met by their gove~nments in adjusting the whole range of our relations with 
those governments; 
(6) study afresh all the political problems of the region 
which contain the seeds of expanded conflict, with special attention to the 
relevance of the experiences of Burma and~. 
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It is not certain that any of these approaches may be fruitful. 
The difficulties which have been encountered on all sides in attempting 
to bring about a peaceful settlement in Laos is indicative of what is in-
volved in any significant change from the present course in Southeast Asia. 
But difficulties of change, notwithstanding, the fact remai~s that the 
present course is, as it has been for a long tim~, at best, a mark-time 
course of years and decades of immense cost to the people of the United 
States and, at worst, it is a collision course . 
It is clearly in the interests of this nation to adjust that 
course if it is at all possible to do so with honor and decency. May I 
say, further, that this nation owes apology to no nation if it seeks to 
lighten its commitments in Southeast Asia through a vigorous diplomacy-~as 
we have been doing with respect to Laos--and a much more discriminating and 
prudent use of its resources. We have done our share, ~ than our share 
to sustain friendly governments in Asia. We will go on doing it. We will 
meet treaty commitments which are binding on our honor . But, at the same 
time, let there be no doubt that the time is long past due when we must 
explore every avenue which may lead to a situation in Southeast Asia, less 
dependent on the resources of this nation for its cement . In the search for 
that situation the President needs the understanding and support of the nation 
and I have no doubt that it will be forthcoming. 
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